Economy of Qing Empire

Economy of Qing Empire

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTANINFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES UNIVERSITYOF MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

WORKtopic “Economy of Qing Empire”

- 2012

Contents

Introduction

I.    Economy of Qing Empire

      Economy during the early Qing

II.   State control of the economy

      Isolationist trade policy

        The Opium Wars

III.         Qing Empire in the system of world trade

      Russian-Qing economic relation

        Enforcement of a foreign sector

IV.         Economical crisis (1909-1913)

Conclusion

Introduction

Qin dynasty, after unifying the territory later known as "China", took some contradictory measures to enhance the economical productivity of the empire. On the one side, money and weights and measures were standardized throughout all commanderies, leading to smoother transactions over longer distances. On the other side, the First Emperor and his successors ordered gigantic construction work in the Capital Xianyang and its surroundings as well as in other parts of the empire. The tomb of the First Emperor, the Epang Palace and the Great Wall are the most famous examples. Higher taxes and intensive corvée labour required from the peasants prevented the "national economy" from reposing after decades if not centuries of permanent warfare.

The economic policy of the Qin was compared by the early Han period writer Jia Yi with that of a wartime economy kept running even in peacetime. The exploitation of the peasantry finally lead to uprisings that would bring the downfall of the dynasty. The economic history of China stretches over thousands of years and has undergone alternating cycles of prosperity <#"804323.files/image001.gif">      Economy during the early Qing

The Qing Dynasty, also Empire of the Great Qing or Great Qing, was the last imperial dynasty <#"804323.files/image001.gif">      Isolationist trade policy

Free trade and peace go together; protectionism is the handmaiden of war. These were key teachings of the early classical economists, as well as the Austrians. Consistent libertarians have never doubted it. But recently the theory has come under fire from all sides and led to dangerous coalitions pushing for the worst of all worlds, autarky and military belligerence.lies usually begin with the word "isolationism." It was FDR's smear term for the mass movement trying to prevent the U.S. from intervening in another horrific European war. Isolationism meant the desire to keep the troops out of harm's way. But this position by no means precluded trading relations. Sweden, Portugal, and Switzerland, for example, spared themselves disaster by adopting the American framers' policy of military neutrality and trade with all sides.forward to the end of the war, when Harry Truman and his cronies had the bright idea of blowing billions in foreign aid. The "isolationists," said Truman, opposed it in favor of letting free markets rebuild Europe. Fast forward again, to George Bush and his Gulf War. The people who opposed risking American lives to preserve Saudi domination of oil markets were also denounced as isolationists. Also 'isolationist" were those people who, four years later, opposed the preferential, tax-funded, regulated trade cartel of Nafta. So far, then, it appears that holding an isolationist position is an unmitigated good: against war, against foreign aid, against preferential trade agreements, but for free trade. Should the term be worn as a badge of honor? Not quite yet, for the great China debate has hugely complicated matters. On one side, there are people who want to treat China as part of the community of nations, by encouraging its 15-year experiment in capitalist economic policies. This has resulted in a historic economic boom of double-digit annual growth, unprecedented freedom and prosperity for huge elements of the population, and a dramatic decline in government power. Within the lifetimes of every middle-aged person, the country has moved from mass starvation and terror to accommodating huge commercial centers that rival Houston and Montreal. The Chinese authorities can call it communism if they want to, but the system rising there is more Mises than Marx.the other side of the China debate is a motley coalition of activists - invariably called isolationists - who know and care nothing about economics, and, in fact, show disdain for it. This coalition includes old-time warmongers hoping to use China as the preferred enemy in a renewed Cold War. It includes labor unions who want to stiff-arm American consumers into not buying Chinese products. It includes the managers of protectionist industries who want to keep products out. It includes the munitions manufacturers who need another excuse for a government contract. And, of course, it includes clueless national socialists who oppose all forms of international trade. They delude themselves into viewing economic exchange as a form of warfare that compels retaliation. They use phrases like "China's aggressive trade and military policies" as if a boatload of party hats is the equivalent of a bomb. They attribute the very existence of trade to entities like the "China Lobby," as if there weren't millions of people here and there who benefit.go so far as to compare China to the old Soviet Union, as if our only option is a nuclear showdown, or, in the case of William Hawkins, adviser to Rep. Duncan Hunter of California, Hitler's Germany, as if the only option is world war. Every uptick in Chinese prosperity, far from being a cause for celebration is a disaster. Hawkins, whose salary is paid by the taxpayers, sees a security threat in the fact that "trade and investment is helping that country's infrastructure and industrial base." Precisely: that's what it is supposed to do, and that's why trade and free enterprise is a great thing. Why is it necessary to point this out?makes this menacing anti-China coalition unusual is the addition of certain elements of the religious right. They say the Chinese government violates human rights, suppresses religious liberty, and uses slave labor, and therefore "we" (meaning the U.S. government) ought to shut down its booming trade relations with the U.S.one time, these same people cared intensely about violations of religious liberty here at home. They had seen the Waco massacre, seen homeschoolers rounded up for educating their children, seen pastors dragged off to jail for refusing to register their church schools, and fought the Supreme Court on a host of issues where it has usurped individual, family, and local rights. They battled the real enemy: their own government, which has subsidized cultural breakdown and suppressed religious freedom at every turn. What's happened? Did they get bored with the fight that really matters? Certainly it's easier, and much more respectable within the beltway, to fight real and alleged infractions halfway around the globe than to face the awful reality of Leviathan here at home. But it's a grave error that can only lead to political and economic disaster. Are there no prisoners of conscience in U.S. jails that merit attention? Is it not slave labor that Americans are forced to work half the year to pay the tax bill before they can begin providing for their families? Are no religious rights being violated when a distant central government prevents a local school choir from singing carols at the school play? Is religious liberty secure when an unconstitutional national police force torches and murders an entire religious community, and then jails the few survivors for 40 years?tragedy is this: by focusing on distant crimes we cannot prevent, while ignoring those at home we can stop, we play right into the hands of big government. Punishing China with embargoes and trade restrictions does nothing to improve life in China, even while it strengthens the hand of government here at home. We put the real enemy of liberty in charge of telling American producers and consumers what they can and cannot buy from abroad, and at what prices. Further, the anti-China crowd is proposing to punish the Chinese people for the infractions of the Chinese government. The stakes are huge. U.S. and Chinese corporations are in the process of developing joint ventures to open up new and hugely profitable shipping lanes from California to the northern regions of China that have not yet benefitted from the economic boom. If a trade war breaks out, as the actual isolationists would like, all of this would be lost, and millions of people would be condemned to continued poverty. How can the anti-China protectionists live with this on their consciences?'s fashionable these days to disparage people's desire for consumer goods obtained through international trade. American consumers who don't want to pay higher prices or join the trade war are said to be greedy and materialistic, putting Tickle-Me-Elmo dolls ahead of human rights. Similarly, we are encouraged to curl our lips at the idea that the Chinese people want to gain access to fast-food hamburgers - which we take for granted but which would be a dream-come-true for people who have lived under the communist yoke for so long. If we believe in liberty, we must understand that economic liberty is the most important kind. It is what touches our lives in the fullest possible way. What is the alleged right to vote compared with the real right to start a business, draw wages according to our productivity, keep the fruits of our labor, feed our family, save for the future, create a civilization? These are all components of capitalism, the only system truly compatible with the first and most important of human rights: the right to own and control what is yours.old classical liberals linked trade and peace because people with a commercial interest in good relations are likely to urge their own governments not to pursue the path of destruction and barriers. It's true in the Chinese case too. Disparage international business if you want, but as a lobbying force, we have it to thank for dousing the flames of war that labor unions, domestic bomb makers, and national socialists keep trying to fan.'s a small step from advocating blockades with a country to urging full-scale military attack. Mr. Hawkins warns that the U.S. needs to "hobble China." How? By using "America's current advantage in economic and military strength to fortify its preeminence in Asia." U.S. "preeminence in Asia"? Can we imagine Washington or Jefferson talking that way? Why don't we just set up a world government and run the entire planet while we're at it? If that's what the U.S. has in mind, it's a recipe for global tyranny. It would bankrupt this country. It would make the U.S. Constitution - already ignored - a permanent dead letter. It would keep Leviathan's grip fastened on the American people until the end of time. It would lead to perpetual war in the name of perpetual human rights.

At the end of the 1800s China's four million square miles held 450 million people, up from 200 million a century earlier. The ruling dynasty was the Ching, established by Manchus from Manchuria, who in 1644 had superseded the Ming. These descendants of the Tatars appreciated Chinese civilization and adopted a conciliatory attitude toward their subjects. They refused, however, to allow intermarriage with the Chinese, for they realized that only their blood difference kept them from being assimilated and conquered. By and large, however, the Manchus gradually became Chinese in their attitudes and habits. The Manchu emperors were remarkably successful. The reign of Chien-lung (1736-1795) was a time of great expansion. The Manchus gained Turkestan, Burma, and Tibet. By the end of the eighteenth century Manchu power extended even into Nepal, and the territory under the Ching control was as extensive as under any previous dynasty.foreigners were especially irritated by the high customs duties the Chinese forced them to pay and by the attempts of Chinese authorities to stop the growing import trade in opium. The drug had long been used to stop diarrhea, but in the seventeenth and eighteenth century people in all classes began to use it recreationally. Most opium came from Turkey or India, and in 1800 its import was forbidden by the imperial government. Despite this restriction, the opium trade continued to flourish. Privately owned vessels of many countries, including the United States, made huge profits from the growing number of Chinese addicts. The government in Peking noted that the foreigners seemed intent on dragging down the Chinese through the encouragement of opium addiction.the meantime, the empire faced other problems. The army became corrupt and the tax farmers defrauded the people. The central bureaucracy declined in efficiency, and the generally weak emperors were unable to meet the challenges of the time. The balance of trade turned against the Chinese in the 1830s, and the British decided to force the issue of increased trade rights. The point of conflict was the opium trade. By the late 1830s more than 30,000 chests, each of which held about 150 pounds of the extract, were being brought in annually by the various foreign powers. Some authorities assert that the trade in opium alone reversed China's formerly favorable balance of trade. In the spring of 1839 Chinese authorities at Canton confiscated and burned the opium. In response, the British occupied positions around Canton. the war that followed, the Chinese could not match the technological and tactical superiority of the British forces. In 1842 China agreed to the provisions of the Treaty of Nanking. Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain, and other ports, including Canton, were opened to British residence and trade. It would be a mistake to view the conflict between the two countries simply as a matter of drug control; it was instead the acting out of deep cultural conflicts between east and west.French and Americans approached the Chinese after the Nanking Treaty's provisions became known, and in 1844 gained the same trading rights as the British. The advantages granted the three nations by the Chinese set a precedent that would dominate China's relations with the world for the next century. The "most favored nation" treatment came to be extended so far that China's right to rule in its own territory was limited. This began the period referred to by the Chinese as the time of unequal treaties - a time of unprecedented degradation for China. The humiliation the Central Kingdom suffered is still remembered and strongly affects important aspects of its foreign policy. Meanwhile, the opium trade continued to thrive. The British and French again defeated China in a second opium war in 1856. By the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin (1858) the Chinese opened new ports to trading and allowed foreigners with passports to travel in the interior. Christians gained the right to spread their faith and hold property, thus opening up another means of western penetration. The United States and Russia gained the same privileges in separate treaties.merchants were frustrated by Chinese trade laws and refused to cooperate with Chinese legal officials because of their routine use of torture. Upon his arrival in Canton in March, 1839, the Emperor's special emissary, Lin Ze-xu, took swift action against the foreign merchants and their Chinese accomplices, making some 1,600 arrests and confiscating 11,000 pounds of opium. Despite attempts by the British superintendent of trade, Charles Elliot, to negotiate a compromise, in June Lin ordered the seizure another 20,00 crates of opium from foreign-controlled factories, holding all foreign merchants under arrest until they surrendered nine million dollars worth of opium, which he then had burned publicly. Finally, he ordered the port of Canton closed to all foreign merchants. Elliot in turn ordered a blockade of the Pearl River. In an ensuing naval battle, described as a victory by Chinese propagandists, in November 1839 the Royal Navy sank a number of Chinese vessels near Guangzhou. By January 1841, the British had captured the Bogue forts at the Pearl's mouth and controlled the high ground above the port of Canton. Subsequently, British forces scored victories on land at Ningbo and Chinhai, crushing the ill-equipped and poorly trained imperial forces with ease. Viewed as too moderate back at home, in August 1841 Elliot was replaced by Sir Henry Pottinger to launch a major offensive against Ningbo and Tiajin. By the end of June British forces occupied Zhenjiang and controlled the vast rice-growing lands of southern China.

The key to British victory was Her Majesty's Navy, which used the broadside with equal effect against wooden-hulled vessels, fortifications are river mouths, and city walls. The steel-hulled Nemesis <#"804323.files/image001.gif">     
Russian-Qing economic relation

The Qing was China's last centralized dynasty. During its almost three-hundred-year-long reign, it achieved regional supremacy before sliding into a decline that occurred contemporaneously with the West's rise to global pre-eminence. The expansion of the Western world inevitably led to the disintegration of China's centuries-old tribute system, and changes in the way the Qing government interacted with its foreign counterparts. The establishment of a foreign ministry in the 1860s and the assignment of the first permanent diplomatic envoys abroad in the 1870s signalled the Qing dynasty's gradual adoption of a Western, more modernistic, system of diplomacy. Researchers raise several explanations for China's diplomatic clashes with Western countries and the ultimate changes in its foreign policy behavior. They include the shift in the balance of power from East to West, fundamental changes in Qing ideals, sense of identity and preferences and the conflicting systems of these two, quite different civilizations. The focus of this essay is on material and ideational explanations. The material explanation maintains that Qing foreign policy behavior adjusted in order to maximize China's material interests in view of the shift in power dynamics between East and West. From the ideational standpoint, adjustments to Qing foreign policy behavior were the result of changes in the preferences, values and behavioral norms of China's rulers. The aim of this essay explores the basis of change in Qing dynasty foreign policy and determines whether its behavioral adjustments were as a result of ideational or material factors.concept of ‘ideas’ is not always clear in context of the argument that ideas propel changes in the behavior of nations. Certain scholars argue that ideas are akin to power and interests insofar as being important variables when explaining state behaviour. Robert H. Jackson, however, argues that the post-World War II decolonization movement cannot be explained in terms of power or interests; that ideas and norms constitute the leading explanation for this phenomenon. This explanation places ideas in direct opposition to interests and power. Although the definition of ideas often seems clear in context, using the term as an explanatory variable can sometimes lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Such misapprehensions are attributable to ideas and interests at times, and times not, coinciding. Ideas encompass desires and knowledge and constitute the actor's interests; they are its aspirations. Knowledge involves an actor's expectations but not its interests. As Alexander Wendt notes, ‘not all ideas are interests; in fact, most are not’. Interests form part of an actor's ideas (in view of ideas also being capable of constructing the actor's identity, thereby changing its preferences) but not their entirety. Arguing whether it is ideas or interests that produce an affect, therefore, is likely to generate conceptual confusion and divergent understandings. From an ideational standpoint, it is the material, rather than interests, that opposes ideas. An explanation that treats ideas and interests as different sources of behaviour is likely to conclude that ideational interests are in opposition to material interests. An explanation that views the concept of power and interests in opposition may be understood on the premise of the actor's preferences remaining constant. An ideational explanation, however, stems from a change in the actor's perceptions of its interests. In either case, employing “ideas” to explain behavioural changes necessitates identification of the changes in the actor's concept of its interests, that is, its sense of identity, value system and standards of behaviour.and material interpretations of adjustments in Qing foreign policy necessitate distinguishing purely material, materially cognitive, and purely conceptual explanations.material interpretations of state behaviour are based on the objective distribution of tangible power. Aspirations, beliefs, and other ideas are not considered as relevant variables. This type of analysis is generally championed by Realist scholars. Perhaps, the most representative example is Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics. With Waltz's theoretical framework, state behavior is largely determined by the pressure generated by the international system, and therefore cannot be viewed as an expression of a nation's subjective desires. Waltz argues that the structure of the system works as a selecting function because structures select by rewarding some behaviors and punishing others, outcomes cannot be inferred from intentions and behavior. Insofar as selection rules, results can be predicted whether or not the actors’ intentions and whether or not they understand structural constraints are known. In other words, the actor may or may not be cognizant of structural restrictions on its behavior or, although aware of them, may not necessarily behave in the way most likely to be rewarded, or least likely to be punished; it is the structure that plays the main role as regards the effect of the actor's choice, structure being the deciding factor as to what kind of competitor is most likely to succeed. Within this theory the actor's ideas, therefore, are unimportant.variance in this body of logic maintains that material factors have a strong bearing on ideational elements. That is to say, in time actors’ ideas adapt to the material reality, the underlying logic being that erroneous cognition of the outside world could lead actors to suboptimal situations that ultimately cause them to adjust their behavior. As material factors provide impetus for such a process, it may be classed as a material explanation.regards the international system, cognitive material-based interpretations, in common with purely material explanations, proceed on the assumption that there has been no change in the actors’ preferences. Cognitive material explanations concern the behaviour of nations as it is affected by the actors’ level of cognition of the international environment, the power dynamics among states, and the capabilities of rivals. They account for the situation where, despite all material factors remaining constant, changes in an actor's cognition of the outside world result in behavioral adjustments.is a body of accumulated, world-related data. A general understanding of it is manifest in an objective view of the world. Explaining the behavior of an enterprise from an economics standpoint requires much more information than the functions of cost and demand; other factors, such as the industry's history, also imbue a great deal of useful information relevant to understanding enterprise behavior. Similarly, in international relations, the information on which a country bases its view of the outside world is likely to be based predominantly on the balance of power, manifest in forms and modes of behavior. Variances in these two factors can lead to differences in state behavior. When inferring a country's behavior, an analysis at the unit level, necessitates a substantial fund of relevant knowledge, including expectations of behavior. An analysis based on preferences and desires, rather than knowledge of the outside world, cannot determine how an actor will behave because desires do not fully account for the conditions under which action occurs. An actor's knowledge and expectations do not feature in the content of many rational choice-based analyses because their hypothetical actors have complete knowledge., the knowledge that nations will always strive to enhance their security and economic interests is insufficient to predict how they will act. Other kinds of information, such as the state under observation's knowledge of the international system, of its own strength and the reliability of its partners, are relevant when predicting its behavior. Scholars have demonstrated beyond doubt the utility of additional information of this nature in understanding state behavior. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, for example, have shown that it is policymakers’ perception of the offence-defense balance rather than the actual disparity between offensive and defensive capabilities that influences a nation's balancing behavior. The actor that attaches most importance to material factors necessarily acts on the basis of certain knowledge and information. That an individual strives to achieve an objective within a limited scope of choice is supported by rational choice theory. On this basis, the individual chooses the action it perceives as most helpful in achieving its objective, and it is rational behaviour that guides the way to the goal in question. Such an actor will always strive to achieve the optimum result. Yet, rational choices are all made under a set of constraints, cognition of which is an essential aspect of the decision making process within the rational choice model. Actors require certain knowledge and information in order to be able to evaluate the likely costs and benefits of their actions. For example, if Country A has 50 cannon, while its rival, Country B, has 100, Country A will be disinclined to instigate conflict. If, however, faulty information leads Country A mistakenly to believe that its rival has only ten cannon, Country A's ‘knowledge’ of its adversary's capabilities may have significant ramifications as regards changes in its behavior. Using similar reasoning, cognitive material explanations view the actual power discrepancy between China and the West as less important than the Qing government's perceptions of the balance of power when interpreting its foreign policy decisions.making within cognitive material explanations is nonetheless based on consideration of material factors rather than ideational interests. In this view, the only variables that lead a nation to change its behavior are those of information and knowledge. In other words, varying evaluations of material factors on the part of a nation can lead to differences in its behavior.the distinction between material cognitive strength and material explanations becomes blurred. Material cognitive strength explanations adhere to the logic whereby it is a nation's consideration of its material interests that leads to perception of relevant material factors that acts as the catalyst for a change in national behavior. Within this type of analysis, material factors remain the fundamental cause of action. It could consequently be interpreted as a material explanation. Consider, for example, the following seemingly straightforward material explanation: ‘the thief came by so everyone ran away’. This explanation implies that ‘everyone’ recognizes the thief for what he is and is able to predict his behaviour. In other words, even though the background knowledge and common sense that allow ‘everyone’ to make inferences about the thief are not explicitly stated, knowledge clearly plays a role in the group's reasoning process. In international relations, coercive behaviour follows a similar logic. For instance, weak nations often yield to their stronger counterparts even when these dominant states do not resort to force. This situation is fundamentally different from one in which a weaker state is forced to bend to the will of its rival. In the former scenario, the weaker state still has the choice of whether or not to comply (even though the potential alternative is extremely undesirable). Coercive behaviour, therefore, is made possible by virtue of the weaker party's knowledge and expectations. As in the example of the thief, however, the role of knowledge and expectations is often overlooked. This is because the unequal strength of rivals plays such a decisive role in the latter example of coercive behaviour that the submissive behaviour of states under coercion is generally attributed to strictly material factors.cognitive material explanations, the actor's choice of mode of behaviour is rationally instrumental as regards the logic of expected consequences. The actors’ preferences being constant, the main issue is that of choice of mode, while it is variances in an actor's perceived knowledge of the outside world that influence its evaluation of the cost and benefits of different modes of behaviour.type of explanation is based on the following form of cognition: Not that an actor's interests are completely material, certain of them are built on ideas, which lead its behaviour and constitute an independent variable when explaining behaviour. This kind of explanation involves changes in the actor's preferences and sense of identity and values. A change in the actor's interests causes a corresponding change in its behaviour that cannot be explained by purely material factors. Ideas involve desires and knowledge; purely ideational explanations focus on the influence of a change in the actor's ‘desires’ (or aspirations) on state behaviour. Within such an explanation, it is the logic of appropriateness, and not rational logic that is inferred as instrumental in the effect. Academic use of conceptual explanations is illustrated in the following example. In his analysis of the post-World War II decolonization movement, Robert Jackson argues that the decolonization drive was a fundamentally normative struggle. Decolonization was neither the result of a shift in power dynamics nor of a change in fundamental imperialist economic interests; it was driven by a change in the common perception of legitimacy. Decolonization was more a revolution of ideas regarding international statecraft and whether or not it could be considered legitimate rather than of power. Jackson observes that proponents of decolonization were supported in their demands for independence by prevailing norms and ideals. Nationalists knew that within this atmosphere of democratization, their opponents would be hard put to refute their arguments. Although Jackson does not completely deny the role that power and interests played in decolonization, he nevertheless regards the evolution of ideals as the driving force behind the movement. Jackson's conceptual explanation of decolonization uses change in worldview as its independent variable. More specifically, he focuses on how an actor's values and sense of legitimacy are able to influence its behavior.a broad sense, the notion of ‘ideas’ encompasses preferences, desires, knowledge, and information. State behaviour being the product of conscious decision-making, all behavior may be said to have passed through the medium of ‘ideas’. Yet, if any explanation that touches upon ‘ideas’ is to be regarded as ideational, then virtually all explanations could be so categorized. Similarly, material explanations in which all relevant factors are viewed as material would also regard the human brain as material, thereby cancelling out any possible ideational explanation. Ideas constitute an extremely broad concept, and if no limitations are imposed on the scope of ideational explanations, they can be applied in almost every case, which reduces their significance. This is not to say that all explanations incorporating relevant ideational elements are ideational; or that all analyses that touch upon material elements are material. What relevant is the underlying mechanism of cause and effect that leads actors to make behavioural choices. A consideration that clearly distinguishes material interests, informational factors and a sense of values, therefore, is of benefit.the basis of the above considerations, this essay holds that when changes in ideas are raised as the possible cause of changes in behaviour, exactly the change that the actor's sense of identity and of appropriate behaviour has undergone must be defined; an ideational explanation, therefore, does not account for the influence changes in the actor's information have on changed behaviour. Moreover, neither can the use of ideas as a device for pursuing material interests be viewed as an ideational explanation.manner in which human rights issues are treated in American foreign policy illustrates this point. While protecting human rights is itself in the interests of the United States, it is also an issue that is pursued in order to achieve other objectives. If the United States’ decision to respect human rights were to lead to changes in American foreign policy, this change in behaviour would certainly merit an ideational explanation. The aim of the above distinction is to avoid an ideational explanation for almost all of state behaviour, in particular that which exhibits initiative. As John Hall once said, ‘Ideas are not held to be determinant in some free-floating way’, and if research ‘is based on the acknowledgment that social actors have both ideal and material interests, it has much to recommend it’.distinction is helpful as regards a deeper cognizance of the opposing affects of the respective influences of ideational and material factors on behaviour, and of the absence of information from the equation.is worth pointing out that this essay in no way refutes that ideas play as significant a role in any determination of behaviour as material factors. As conscious behaviour goes through mental processes, the actor's framework of cognition is bound to influence its behaviour. This makes an abstract weighing-up of the contrasting influences of the ideational and the material extremely difficult. Explanations based on information and cognition of material factors, no matter how various, take a fundamentally different approach from those based on the actor's ideas. In order to give a succinct explanation of changes in behaviour it is important to separate these two analytical approaches. The focus of the foregoing three explanations is on the motivation for changes in Qing Dynasty diplomatic behaviour. It asks, did material factors, in particular cognition of material information, or a change in the sense of values and concepts of appropriate behaviour play the more dominant role in changed behaviour. Bearing in mind the distinctions made in this essay, from a cause and effect perspective, it was the Qing Dynasty's gradual cognisance of the shift in balance of power between China and the West (albeit it sluggishly and with only a clouded perception of its full significance) that caused the change in its diplomatic behaviour. This essay does not regard such a change as ideational. Even from the point of view of the most materially motivated actor, owing to the information factor, non-cognition of information was not instrumental in the change in Qing diplomatic behaviour.raises the question of how can one evaluate the effectiveness of ideational and material explanations. To this end, we offer a rough guideline: In effective material analyses, there must be a plausible explanation for behavioural adjustments without resorting to changes in concepts of legitimacy. From the ideational standpoint, the change in behaviour resulted from a specific change in ideas, and can be traced to it.made these distinctions, it must be borne in mind that they are operational guidelines only, and not intended to constitute full, appropriate conditions for a firm ideational or material explanation.dynasty foreign policy was chosen as the subject for this analysis for several reasons. First, the dynasty's reign encompassed a prolonged period of stability that culminated in significant change. The length of the Qing reign, however, does not compromise the effectiveness of variables that occurred within it. This would be the case if the essay were to choose a period in whose extent the actor underwent a fundamental change in identity. In, for example, an analysis of China throughout the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing periods, the differing value systems of these successive dynasties would undoubtedly have significant impact on the foreign policy behaviour of the actor in question. Specific selection of the Qing dynasty allows for the study of cultural and normative differences between China and the West in a number of different contexts. Initially, cross-cultural contact was extremely rare, but by the end of the dynasty it had become quite commonplace. An analysis of this period of history may determine whether changes in Qing foreign policy were brought about by transformation of the Qing value system, changes in material factors or cognition of material factors. This case examines a period of history long enough to cover the related concept of essential change in identity.to the mid 19th century, China's diplomatic practice was almost exclusively confined to the tribute system. Imperial China's vast, independent territory also had considerable influence on its dealings with the West. The Chinese people regarded the Emperor as the ruler of ‘all under heaven’; no other monarch in their perceived view of the world shared his near god-like status. Diplomatic exchanges were not regarded as a necessary aspect of the Emperor's activities. China's smaller, neighbouring states, however, believed that they had much to gain by establishing ties with their large, powerful neighbour. They pursued relationships with this dominant power within their midst with political, economic, and cultural interests in mind. The tribute system, therefore, existed on the basis of disparity of power and interests.substance of the tribute system was initially nebulous; it took hundreds of years for this institution to develop into its full formality. It originated in the archaic system of tributes paid to the Emperor by vassal states during the chaotic pre-Qin period and reached its zenith during the Ming Dynasty. Institutionalization of this system increased its complexity. The Ming and Qing dynasties imposed rigorous regulations regarding the appointed time, personnel, and itinerary of foreign countries wishing to pay tribute. Abiding by the host of conditions stipulated by the court regarding tribute protocol was crucial. Visiting foreign dignitaries were expected to spend the time necessary on versing themselves in the relevant ceremonials before they were allowed to go about their business.tribute system in force during Ming and Qing dynasties was imbued with pre-Qin ceremonial and symbolic significance. A certain number of tributary states, however, played only a symbolically subordinate role in the tribute giving ritual. Chinese rule was nominal rather than actual. The governance of old imperial China adhered to the principle of national unity, in which feudal rulers formed relationships with foreign officials within the framework of the tribute system. The parties concerned enacted the roles of the highly respected, high ranking Chinese superior and lowly, deferential foreign subordinate, a relationship reflected in tribute documents as well as ceremony. The system actually worked to maintain relations with, rather than subjugate, neighbouring countries. It was also one of material benefit to tributary states, as they were often rewarded with gifts more valuable than those they had originally offered in tribute.

      Enforcement of a foreign sector

Upon overthrowing the Ming dynasty, the incoming Qing rulers inherited its system of tribute. The Qing court was punctilious about the rules attached to paying tribute. In common with its predecessors, the new government imposed specific regulations as to when and how foreign nations were permitted to pay tribute to the imperial court. In 1637, for example, the Qing government ruled, ‘It is agreed that Korea may pay tribute once annually in addition to at the Holy and Pure Festival, New Year and the Winter Solstice.’ This rule remained in force until the outbreak of the Opium Wars in 1840. Another instance occurred in 1829, when Vietnam moved its capital to Fuchun. The new capital was even more distant from Zhennanguan, the prescribed point of entry by inland water route from which the Vietnamese made their way to Peking. Vietnamese officials requested permission to travel by an alternative, maritime route from southern Canton. The emperor refused, on the grounds that it would violate convention. The rules applying to the number of foreign delegations coming to Peking by ship or road to give tribute were more or less the same as those of the preceding Ming Dynasty. In 1652, the Qing Dynasty ruled that, ‘Representatives of all countries coming by land to pay tribute must not exceed 100. Twenty may enter the capital while the remainder stays on the outskirts and waits for their largess; those arriving by a maritime route must travel in no more than three ships and not exceed 100 person per ship. The remainder is not permitted to disembark’. Another edict issued by the Qing government in 1644 states, ‘Countries may pay tribute depending on their official documents and local produce’. Tribute documents were based on Qin Dynasty memorials from vassal states entering the suzerain. They exemplified the underlying principal-subordinate relationship of the tribute system, their language based on imperial edicts and tribute ceremonials. China's rulers, however, had a clear and pragmatic approach to the tribute system. They were aware that the main objective of many tributary expeditions, superficial protestations of loyalty and obedient kowtows notwithstanding, was to carry on trade. The grandiose and chauvinistic language espoused by the Qing court, therefore, was largely symbolic. China's illusion of its superiority over its neighbours did not stem from a desire for global dominance. In reality, Qing leaders were content to seal themselves off from the outside world, having little interest in forging relationships with other nations.to the 19th century, China and the West conducted their international affairs on the basis of completely different norms. The setting of respective permanent missions in Italian city-states and their vassals, other than at times of war, became conventional practice in the early 15th century. The Italian practice gradually made its way to other European nations. By the end of the 16th century, the phenomenon whereby serious diplomatic relationships between monarchs, put in place during peacetime and maintained in the midst of European power struggles by means of reciprocally assigned permanent foreign envoys, had become relatively common. By the latter half of the 17th century, the exchange of permanent diplomatic missions among Western nations and their counterparts was also commonplace.

The Peace Treaty of Westphalia marked the formation of a set of Western norms that would shape the international system. In time, the canon of conventions governing international relations became increasingly complex. The 1815 Congress of Vienna, for example, sought to standardize norms applying to diplomacy and commerce and also to codify court protocol. The standard Western etiquette for greeting a foreign head of state stated that visiting emissaries should, upon presenting themselves to the monarch, bow three times before directly presenting diplomatic credentials. After a brief conversation, the emissary repeated the initial ritual before making his exit with a full bow, rather than getting down on one knee.^{21 <http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/3/447.full>} These details are important by virtue of their complete contrast to Chinese protocol. The voyages of discovery during the 15th and 16th centuries that increased interaction between China and the West led inevitably to conflicting perceptions of the rituals appropriate to diplomatic protocol.Qing dynasty forbade maritime intercourse with foreign countries shortly after it was founded, much to the dismay of ambitious European traders. Eager to surpass their Spanish and Portuguese rivals, the Dutch decided to join the tribute system as a means to gaining access to Chinese markets. Holland, according to tributary state protocol, was assigned a set time frame and itinerary for offering tribute.1653, the governor of Dutch Batavia dispatched a special envoy to Canton (Guangdong province) where he made the request to pay tribute and at the same time trade. The envoy, however, had not brought with him the requisite tribute documents or gifts and was refused. The Dutch official immediately expressed willingness to respect China's customs, and suggested that he would despatch members of his retinue back to Batavia to obtain the necessary documents and gifts and awaited their return in the provincial capital of Guangzhou, so that he can travel to Peking to offer tribute when the necessary preparations had been made. But this request was denied by Peking.years later, the Batavian governor again dispatched a special envoy. On this occasion extra care had been taken to ensure that the required materials were prepared. The envoy then requested, and was granted, the Qing court's permission to enter the capital. During his time in Peking, the Dutch envoy adhered strictly to all ceremonial rituals required of him, to the extent of executing the full kowtow before the Emperor. All of this, as may be inferred, was motivated by Dutch desire to establish trade relations with China. The court's response to the Dutch tribute and request to trade was one of ‘sympathy and understanding for the people from a distant land’, and to extend the tribute period (to eight years) on condition that, ‘the tribute delegation does not exceed 100 members, 20 of whom may enter the capital; all produce carried must be handed over to the Embassy. There must be no unauthorised selling of merchandise on the East China Sea’. This actually restricted the scope of tributes received by the Qing court which, moreover, refused all requests to engage in direct trade.ban on maritime trade and intercourse with foreign countries was lifted after Taiwan came under Qing Dynasty control. Thus the Dutch were able to enter Guangdong and Fujian to trade with China. As, the Dutch sent no more envoys to pay tribute to the Qing court over the succeeding 100 years, their tribute period was curtailed, thereby rendering the regulations pertaining to Dutch tributes nothing more than a worthless scrap of paper.Dutch approach to courting the Qing contrasted with that of other Western diplomatic missions in that it unquestioningly followed the dynasty's established ceremonial protocol. The Dutch obviously expected that abiding by Chinese formalities would advance their trading interests. Moreover, they dared not risk losing favour with the Chinese government merely through a breach of court decorum. The Qing court, on the other hand, regarded Western nations merely as tributary states to whom occasional conciliatory gestures must be made to keep them under control, the selected method of mollification being that of trade. Governmental relations between China and the West were of a loose, nominal nature. Sentiments expressed regarding common protection were in cognizance of China's superior national power, particularly during the flourishing Qing reign. Upon first arriving in China, the Portuguese and Dutch had no illusions about their ability to contend with this huge nation's superior might, an assumption that inhibited them from any attempt at establishing diplomatic relations on a modern, equal footing.the Dutch tribute protocol compromise was not entirely in vain, it nevertheless failed to produce the desired effect, a reality that was not lost on other European countries. The discovery that adherence to Chinese tribute rituals was insufficient to satisfy Western trading ambitions lessened the likelihood of Western deference to the system's ceremony and rituals. Their reasons, on the one hand, were that such concessions would not achieve their desired interests. On the other, as their power grew stronger, the benefits of compromise correspondingly shrank.establishment of Sino-Russian relations in the early 17th century occurred at a crucial point in China's early interactions with the West. The Russians’ first contacts with China marked a change in Qing diplomatic policy, whereby rulers played down their grandiose self-image and liberalised their foreign policy. Despite these conciliatory gestures, however, early Sino-Russian relations were plagued with intense disputes over diplomatic protocol.after the founding of the Qing dynasty, the Russian government dispatched diplomatic envoys to China to explore trading possibilities. In February 1654, the Russians sent Feodor Baikoff and his mission to China. The Russian Czar gave Baikoff detailed instructions as to protocol, stressing that the letter of credence and gifts should be personally handed to the Emperor. He was also emphatic that the Qing Emperor writes the Czar's full name and title on the diplomatic credentials he presented to Baikoff. If there was any variance on this point, the documents were not to be brought back to Russia. The envoy was forbidden to bow to the imperial palace or to kiss the Emperor's feet, although he was permitted to kiss the Emperor's hand. The Russians were evidently ill informed about Chinese diplomatic protocol.this time, the Qing Court was equally unconversant with Russian affairs. It was unaware, for example, that the Cossack invasion of northeast China had actually been Russian. In view of this historical misapprehension, the Qing court assumed that Baikoff's mission to Peking as one based on admiration of China's culture or economic prosperity.arrival of Baikoff's diplomatic mission in Beijing in March 1656, Qing officials requested that, in accordance with standard protocol, the visiting envoys hand gifts and diplomatic credentials over to them, that they may in turn convey them to the Emperor. But the Russian Czar had specifically instructed Baikoff to deliver the documents and gifts personally. This put him in the predicament of being unable to satisfy one set of protocol without breaching the other. After extensive negotiations, Baikoff was compelled to deliver the gifts that the Czar had exhorted him to present directly to his Chinese counterpart to Qing officials. Shortly after, the Qing court demanded that Baikoff also hand over his credentials. On the basis of his original instructions from the Czar, Baikoff refused. After over four months of deadlock, the Qing court eventually elected to compromise and allowed Baikoff personally to present his credentials to the Emperor.of the wrangling between the Russians and Chinese lacked substantive content. As neither side knew very much about the other, each entered into negotiations with a host of unrealistic expectations. While Baikoff's mission and those later lead by Russian envoys Ivan Perfilyev and Abolin were largely unsuccessful, they substantially increased the two sides’ understanding of one another. Later Russian emissaries clearly benefited from the work of these early diplomatic pioneers.lack of understanding between the two nations did not change until after a military dispute during the reign of the Emperor Kangxi. The most intense conflict over protocol in the early days of Sino-Russian relations was triggered by Nicholas Spafari's mission to China. Emperor Kangxi had already sent two letters to the Czar before Spafari's visit in an effort to resolve the conflict at the Heilongjiang river basin as well as the matter of Tahur chief Gantimur's defection to Russia. This made clear the Qing Dynasty's awareness of its need for flexibility and compromise in diplomatic protocol if it were to reach agreement with Russia on major issues. Soon after Spafari arrived in Beijing, he found that his instructions as to how to present his diplomatic credentials conflicted with Chinese protocol. According to Qing protocol, after each country's tribute had crossed the border its credentials and gifts were to be examined by the official of the relevant locality. Before crossing the Nen river, the protocol official Ma La that received Spafari demanded, according to official protocol, that he hand over his credentials in order that they may be checked for ‘discourteous wording’, also the gifts that they may be scrutinized. This request was flatly refused. Spafari insisted on delivering the documents personally to the Emperor.the time the Russian envoy spent in the capital there seemed to be no end of dispute over the respective protocol. In the normal course of events, upon arrival in the capital the foreign envoy would hand over the credence letters and gifts to be presented to the relevant government office for respective translation and checking. The documents would then be submitted to the Qing emperor and the gifts to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On this occasion the Qing court altered conventional protocol by allowing Spafari to place his letter of credence on top of a yellow damask seal case. This and the gifts were then presented to a Grand Secretariats (Great Academicians of the Inner Hall) acting as Emperor Kangxi's representative. Another difference of opinion as to protocol was that of whether or not the Russian visitors should kowtow or, as the Russian Czar had insisted, merely bow to the emperor. As Qing officials were obdurate on this point of etiquette, the Russian emissaries had to decide between compromise or failure to complete their mission; they ultimately opted for the former option.as to the format and style of diplomatic documents further complicated relations. Qing court conventions in this regard were based on imperial edicts issued to vassal states. Letters of credence submitted by vassal states paying tribute were in complete contrast to conventional Western diplomatic intercourse, which were conducted on the basis of equality of both parties. The Russian envoy to China's mandate was that the Czar's complete name and title be written on the Qing Court letter of credence, thereby upholding the Russian ruler's dignity. If the Chinese refused to comply, the document would not be taken back to Russia. Before Spafari returned to Russia, he demanded a copy of the Qing reciprocal letter of credence in Latin, on the grounds of ensuring that it showed his full title and contained no inappropriate wording that might in any way ‘damage the Czar's dignity’. It was by the similar consideration that the Qing court demanded that Spafari submit the Czar's letter of credence to them in order that Qing officials could translate it and ensure that it did not contain any wording that might be considered disrespectful to the emperor. Spafari refused and Qing officials sternly rebutted. As both sides appeared to have reached a stalemate on this issue, the Qing court took the view that ‘talks between the two rulers have reached a conclusion’, and asked Spafari to leave Beijing for Russia as soon as possible without the reciprocal letter of credence.refusing to issue diplomatic credentials to Spafari, the Chinese were able to avoid further dispute. Scholar Li Yunquan points out that in taking this decision, the Qing court nominally maintained the established system of protocol. In reality, however, it had given considerable thought to whether or not the Russians would accept the high-handed, condescending tone in which the Qing letter of credence had been written. It was at this point that it began to occur to Qing officials that official documents other than imperial edicts should be written in less high-blown language. This posits the suggestion that China's knowledge of the outside world had evolved, moreover that in order to protect China's interests the court had to be prepared to compromise when dealing with more powerful counterparts.1689, as both sides engaged in negotiations over the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Russian representative Feodor Golovin requested, in accordance with his mandate, that in credence letters the Qing Emperor be referred to by the same title as the Czar, rather than as ‘the ruler of all under heaven’ in the manner of imperial edicts. Furthermore, the Russians demanded that credentials be delivered according to the Western convention where visiting envoys submitted them directly to the sovereign. The Qing court representative's response was a refusal on both counts by saying that they are unauthorized on them.diplomatic credentials that the Izrailov mission, whose main aim was to increase Russia's trade with China, included all of the Emperor's titles, but referred to him as his ‘majesty’ rather then his ‘highness’. The Russian letter of credence proceeded on considerations of neighbourliness and of maintaining security on their common borders; Emperor Kangxi also broke with convention by personal receiving the document. The Emperor may have accepted the documents, but the Qing court steadfastly refused issue a response. The dispute persisted until 1725, when the Chinese Ministry of Minority affairs and the Russian Privy Council finally worked out a compromise.Qing government showed considerable flexibility in its handling of protocol disputes with the Russians. Although reluctant to yield ground on their concept of diplomatic etiquette, the Chinese compromises reveal that the desire to pursue material interests outweighed ideational interests. The flexibility that the Qing showed in dealing with the Russians did not stem from a change in preferences, values or self-interest; it was a change in material factors that prompted their behavioural adjustments.

McCartney Goes to China

In 1792, England assigned former diplomat and colonial governor George McCartney as head of a delegation to China, ostensibly to celebrate Emperor Qianlong's 83rd birthday. There was considerable confusion as to the real motivation for the visit. The English intended to conduct diplomatic discussions on an equal footing, while the Chinese assumed that the mission was a tribute pilgrimage. When McCartney arrived in Tianjin in August 1793, Emperor Qianlong elected to follow the precedent set by Emperor Kangxi of not insisting on the English following Qing diplomatic protocol to the letter. During the time the mission spent in Tianjin, no disputes over protocol arose. When, however, Emperor Qianlong received the list of gifts the English offered in Chengde, he was incensed at McCartney's title in the Chinese version being translated as ‘imperial envoy’. He immediately issued an edict demanding that the title be changed to that of ‘bearer of tribute’, or ‘payer of respect’. The English made no objections. When Qing officials tactfully notified the English delegation that they should rehearse themselves with the kowtow, McCartney expressed no overt disagreement.

McCartney's way of dealing with the issue was, however, perfunctory. Upon presenting himself before the monarch, he simply refused to perform the required ritual of kneeling three times and touching the floor with his forehead. At Chengde, where the ceremony was to be held, the Qing Court and the McCartney mission wrangled over the protocol involved in greeting the emperor. Emperor Qianlong was furious. On the second day, the Emperor issued an edict to Qing officials in Peking reiterating that protocol be applied to foreign payers of tribute, and to decrease the standard of reception of the England mission. The Qingshigao (Draft History of the Qing Dynasty) mentions protocol flexibility in relation to the English mission's presenting of itself to the emperor: ‘The Emperor issued an edict to the minister of protocol indicating that the protocol followed by the English ambassador McCartney when presenting himself to the monarch should be that followed by foreign dignitaries meeting the English sovereign.’ The Emperor Qianlong thus compromised over protocol, but not because of a change in his preferences, which the brevity of McCartney's stay precludes. It is clear from the Emperor Qianglong's attitude that this compromise was made under extremely undesirable circumstances.^{37 <http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/3/447.full>} The Qing obviously did not regard the mode of protocol in question as appropriate, but allowed it as a superficially friendly makeshift through the medium of the Qing tribute system.the point of view of material interests, the Qing Dynasty method was rational. Bearing in mind the Qing's lack of understanding of the West, it was unaware of any shift in the balance of power between China and the West. From the Qing court perspective, established protocol practices could be preserved. McCartney's dispute over protocol was to them a repeat performance of similar objections by the earlier Russian missions. If these foreigners were not prepared to abide by the established Chinese practices, the worst that could happen would be the court's breaking off of their tributary relations. The Qing court's having established the precedent of protocol flexibility, however, meant that it would not curtail further diplomatic dealings with the English. The court's decision to compromise over the protocol for McCartney's presenting himself to the emperor was undoubtedly influenced by England's show of might, evident in its impressive gifts, including astrological equipment, cannon, model warships, clocks, telescopes, and in the McCartney mission's arriving in England's most formidable warship. The shift in power (not to mention technological) balance was beginning to be apparent.protocol for foreign envoys presenting themselves to the emperor, particularly the dispute over whether or not they should kowtow, continued to be a thorn in the Qing government's side. It was not until the mid-19th century that Qing rulers were aware that it was customary for Western diplomats to hand their diplomatic credentials directly to the ruler they addressed. This practice had been long established in Europe, having been codified at the 1815 Congress of Vienna.September 1860, English and French forces reached Tongzhou on the outskirts of Beijing and presented the Chinese with a list of demands. Cognizant that he was negotiating from a position of weakness, Emperor Xianfeng sanctioned all on the understanding that letters of credence would not ‘personally handed to the emperor’, as this presented ‘ten thousand difficulties’, to the extent that he would not hesitate to draw swords over the issue. In 1867, the Qing court held special discussions on the matter of greeting the emperor. Although Yi Xin, head of the foreign ministry who was among the first to have experience in international affairs, did not specifically raise the matter of adapting to Western protocol in greeting the emperor, he did indicate a change in attitude. Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and other officials advocating Westernization (yangwu pai) advocated giving up conventional tribute protocol, but were equivocal when it came to adopting any other ceremony. Zuo Zongtang, the governor general of Shaanxi and Gansu, clearly advocated Western protocol, but there were still many officials that held strongly to the ritual of kowtowing.neither side would compromise over its respective protocol, negotiations among the countries reached stalemate in 1868. In the meeting the foreign ministry held with the other nations involved, it refused English, French, American, Russian, or German foreign envoys’ request to greet China's ruler. The reason given was that the Emperor had yet to come of age and that it would be inappropriate for the Empress Dowager to greet visiting foreign dignitaries. The matter consequently dragged on until Emperor Tongzhi's 18th birthday in February 1873, when the ostensible reason for refusing access to the Emperor expired. At this point, the Qing court's internal debate over protocol rekindled. On 24 April, Emperor Tongzhi ordered Li Hongzhang, minister in charge of the coastal provinces of Liaoning, Hebei and Shandong, to devise a plan that would, ‘remove obstacles regarding Qing court protocol and that of the foreign nations’. On 1 May, Li Hongzhang presented a memorial to the Emperor in which he spoke of ‘the change of thousands of years’, that Qing Court protocol should, ‘change with the times’, and ‘Western countries should not be treated as tributary states’. If China refused to compromise, the Western powers might use this as an excuse for instigating further aggression. Li knew that if hostilities were to break out, China would be the one to suffer. Compromise seemed to be the only choice for the Chinese. On 29 July 1873, the English, French, Russian, American, Dutch and Japanese envoys had an audience with the Emperor in accordance with Western diplomatic protocol. The dispute had finally been resolved.interests appear to have been the deciding factor in the debate within the Qing government body politic as to adoption of Western protocol. At the time the Emperor went to Chengde, the three kowtows were an unquestioned aspect of tribute protocol. There had obviously been no change in values on that score. The expression in Li Hongzhang's memorial ‘The Change of thousands of years’ expresses the magnitude of change in this Qing official's perception of the outside world. It was based on cognition of the contrasts between China and the international set up, particularly as regards respective strength. Li's insistence that protocol should ‘move with the times’ implied his belief that ideas should adapt to material realities. The recommendations in Li Hongzhang's memorial are clearly based on material interests. He feared that abiding by age-old rituals could create immense material loss. The dragging on of the dispute over protocol, however, expresses the fundamental antipathy of Qing officials towards Western protocol. Ideas, in this instance, impeded rather than promoted change. The change in protocol, therefore, was in no way attributable to a change in the Qing rulers’ ideas.Qing Dynasty had actually made adjustments to protocol relating to foreign dignitaries, the main example that of allowing the Russian Izrailov to hand credence letters directly to Emperor Kangxi. This clearly demonstrates that if circumstances and interests had demanded, the Qing rulers would have considered a revolution in protocol much earlier. The fact that compromises initially applied to Russia, Britain, and other western great powers is very meaningful.

IV.        
Economical crisis (1909-1913)

At the end of the Ming dynasty, just before the Manchus overthrew the Ming and established the Qing dynasty, China's economy was in a period of expansion. New markets were being founded, and merchants were extending their businesses across provincial lines and even into the South China Sea. Chinese merchants were already active in Southeast Asia during this time, and, in fact, one of the arguments then made regarding the cessation of China's state-sponsored maritime expeditions to various places in the southern seas (such as the famed "Ming Voyages") was that these expeditions were no longer necessary. Chinese merchants themselves were going out to the South China Sea and were trading with these areas themselves, so there was no longer a need to have a tributary relationship with other states or city-states in this area. In certain instances the Qing state did balk at the movement of people into overseas commerce and tried to limit rice and metallic currency from moving out of the country, but the state simply did not have the capacity to stop trade completely. The circulation of goods went on with or without state approval. The economic growth so evident under the Ming dynasty continued under the Qing dynasty, up until the time of the Opium War in the 1840s. During this time China’s domestic economy was a dynamic, commercializing economy, and in some small ways, even an industrializing economy. The Stereotype of an "Anti-Merchant" Qing State A common stereotype about late imperial China -- one that is actually perpetuated in the study of practically every period in Chinese history -- is that the Chinese government was anti-merchant. Common reasons given to support this assertion are: that Confucianism was anti-business and anti-merchant; that Confucian scholar-officials were at the top ranks of Chinese society; that state policy impaired economic activity by not supporting it in any constructive way; and that taxes were so heavy that they squeezed the life out of merchants and their businesses. But all these things are untrue.

The Qin dynasty, after unifying the territory later known as "China", took some contradictory measures to enhance the economical productivity of the empire. On the one side, money and weights and measures were standardized throughout all commanderies, leading to smoother transactions over longer distances. On the other side, the First Emperor and his successors ordered gigantic construction work in the Capital Xianyang and its surroundings as well as in other parts of the empire. The tomb of the First Emperor, the Epang Palace and the Great Wall are the most famous examples. Higher taxes and intensive corvée labour required from the peasants prevented the "national economy" from reposing after decades if not centuries of permanent warfare.

The economic policy of the Qin was compared by the early Han period writer Jia Yi with that of a wartime economy kept running even in peacetime. The exploitation of the peasantry finally lead to uprisings that would bring the downfall of the dynasty. The economic history of China stretches over thousands of years and has undergone alternating cycles of prosperity <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosperity> and decline. According to the book 'China and the Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21st century', China <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China> was for a large part of the last two millennia the world's largest economy, even though its wealth remained average <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_regions_by_past_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita>. China's history is usually divided into three periods: The pre-imperial era, consisting of the era of before the unification of Qin, the early imperial era from Qin to Song, and the late imperial era, marked by the economic revolution that occurred during the Song Dynasty.roughly 10,000 BCE, in the Neolithic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neolithic> Era, agriculture was practiced in China. Stratified bronze-age cultures, such asErlitou <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erlitou_culture>, emerged by the third millennium BCE. Under the Shang <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shang_dynasty> (c. 1600-1045 BCE) and Zhou <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Zhou_Dynasty> (1045-771 BCE), a dependent labor force worked in large-scale foundries and workshops to produce bronzes and silk for the elite. The agricultural surpluses produced by the manorial economy <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manorialism> supported these early handicraft <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handicraft> industries as well as urban centers and considerable armies. This system began to disintegrate after the collapse of the Western Zhou Dynasty <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Zhou_Dynasty> in 771 BCE, preceding the Spring and Autumn <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spring_and_Autumn> and Warring states <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warring_states> eras.the feudal system collapsed, much legislative power was transferred from the nobility to local kings. A merchant class emerged during the Warring States Period <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warring_States_Period>, resulting in increased trade. The new kings established an elaborate bureaucracy, using it to wage wars, build large temples, and perform public works projects. This new system <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merit_system> rewarded talent over birthright; important positions were no longer occupied solely by nobility. The adoption of new iron tools revolutionized agriculture and led to a large population increase during this period. By 221 BCE, the state of Qin <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qin_(state)>, which embraced reform more than other states, unified China, built the Great Wall <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Wall>, and set consistent standards of government. Although its draconian laws led to its overthrow in 206 BCE, the Qin institutions survived. During the Han Dynasty, China became a strong, unified, and centralized empire of self-sufficient farmers and artisans, though limited local autonomy remained. The Song Dynasty <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Song_Dynasty> (960-1279 CE) brought additional economic reforms. money, the compass, and other technological advances facilitated communication on a large scale and the widespread circulation of books. The state's control of the economy diminished, allowing private merchants to prosper and a large increase in investment and profit. Despite disruptions during the Mongol conquest of 1279 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_conquest_of_the_Song_Dynasty>, the population much increased under the Ming Dynasty <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ming_Dynasty> and Qing Dynasty <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qing_Dynasty>, but its GDP per capita remained static <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_regions_by_past_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita> since then. In the later Qing period, China's economic development began to slow and Europe's rapid development since the Late Middle Ages <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Late_Middle_Ages> and Renaissance <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renaissance> enabled it to surpass China - an event known as the Great Divergence <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Divergence>.

empire economy opium crisis

Conclusion

Upon overthrowing the Ming dynasty, the incoming Qing rulers inherited its system of tribute. The Qing court was punctilious about the rules attached to paying tribute. In common with its predecessors, the new government imposed specific regulations as to when and how foreign nations were permitted to pay tribute to the imperial court. In 1637, for example, the Qing government ruled, ‘It is agreed that Korea may pay tribute once annually in addition to at the Holy and Pure Festival, New Year and the Winter Solstice.’ This rule remained in force until the outbreak of the Opium Wars in 1840. Another instance occurred in 1829, when Vietnam moved its capital to Fuchun. The new capital was even more distant from Zhennanguan, the prescribed point of entry by inland water route from which the Vietnamese made their way to Peking. Vietnamese officials requested permission to travel by an alternative, maritime route from southern Canton. The emperor refused, on the grounds that it would violate convention. The rules applying to the number of foreign delegations coming to Peking by ship or road to give tribute were more or less the same as those of the preceding Ming Dynasty. In 1652, the Qing Dynasty ruled that, ‘Representatives of all countries coming by land to pay tribute must not exceed 100. Twenty may enter the capital while the remainder stays on the outskirts and waits for their largess; those arriving by a maritime route must travel in no more than three ships and not exceed 100 person per ship. The remainder is not permitted to disembark’. Another edict issued by the Qing government in 1644 states, ‘Countries may pay tribute depending on their official documents and local produce’. Tribute documents were based on Qin Dynasty memorials from vassal states entering the suzerain. They exemplified the underlying principal-subordinate relationship of the tribute system, their language based on imperial edicts and tribute ceremonials. China's rulers, however, had a clear and pragmatic approach to the tribute system. They were aware that the main objective of many tributary expeditions, superficial protestations of loyalty and obedient kowtows notwithstanding, was to carry on trade. The grandiose and chauvinistic language espoused by the Qing court, therefore, was largely symbolic. China's illusion of its superiority over its neighbours did not stem from a desire for global dominance. In reality, Qing leaders were content to seal themselves off from the outside world, having little interest in forging relationships with other nations.to the 19th century, China and the West conducted their international affairs on the basis of completely different norms. The setting of respective permanent missions in Italian city-states and their vassals, other than at times of war, became conventional practice in the early 15th century. The Italian practice gradually made its way to other European nations. By the end of the 16th century, the phenomenon whereby serious diplomatic relationships between monarchs, put in place during peacetime and maintained in the midst of European power struggles by means of reciprocally assigned permanent foreign envoys, had become relatively common. By the latter half of the 17th century, the exchange of permanent diplomatic missions among Western nations and their counterparts was also commonplace.

The Peace Treaty of Westphalia marked the formation of a set of Western norms that would shape the international system. In time, the canon of conventions governing international relations became increasingly complex. The 1815 Congress of Vienna, for example, sought to standardize norms applying to diplomacy and commerce and also to codify court protocol. The standard Western etiquette for greeting a foreign head of state stated that visiting emissaries should, upon presenting themselves to the monarch, bow three times before directly presenting diplomatic credentials. After a brief conversation, the emissary repeated the initial ritual before making his exit with a full bow, rather than getting down on one knee.^{21 <http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/3/447.full>} These details are important by virtue of their complete contrast to Chinese protocol. The voyages of discovery during the 15th and 16th centuries that increased interaction between China and the West led inevitably to conflicting perceptions of the rituals appropriate to diplomatic protocol.Qing dynasty forbade maritime intercourse with foreign countries shortly after it was founded, much to the dismay of ambitious European traders. Eager to surpass their Spanish and Portuguese rivals, the Dutch decided to join the tribute system as a means to gaining access to Chinese markets. Holland, according to tributary state protocol, was assigned a set time frame and itinerary for offering tribute.1653, the governor of Dutch Batavia dispatched a special envoy to Canton (Guangdong province) where he made the request to pay tribute and at the same time trade. The envoy, however, had not brought with him the requisite tribute documents or gifts and was refused. The Dutch official immediately expressed willingness to respect China's customs, and suggested that he would despatch members of his retinue back to Batavia to obtain the necessary documents and gifts and awaited their return in the provincial capital of Guangzhou, so that he can travel to Peking to offer tribute when the necessary preparations had been made. But this request was denied by Peking.years later, the Batavian governor again dispatched a special envoy. On this occasion extra care had been taken to ensure that the required materials were prepared. The envoy then requested, and was granted, the Qing court's permission to enter the capital. During his time in Peking, the Dutch envoy adhered strictly to all ceremonial rituals required of him, to the extent of executing the full kowtow before the Emperor. All of this, as may be inferred, was motivated by Dutch desire to establish trade relations with China. The court's response to the Dutch tribute and request to trade was one of ‘sympathy and understanding for the people from a distant land’, and to extend the tribute period (to eight years) on condition that, ‘the tribute delegation does not exceed 100 members, 20 of whom may enter the capital; all produce carried must be handed over to the Embassy. There must be no unauthorised selling of merchandise on the East China Sea’. This actually restricted the scope of tributes received by the Qing court which, moreover, refused all requests to engage in direct trade.ban on maritime trade and intercourse with foreign countries was lifted after Taiwan came under Qing Dynasty control. Thus the Dutch were able to enter Guangdong and Fujian to trade with China. As, the Dutch sent no more envoys to pay tribute to the Qing court over the succeeding 100 years, their tribute period was curtailed, thereby rendering the regulations pertaining to Dutch tributes nothing more than a worthless scrap of paper.Dutch approach to courting the Qing contrasted with that of other Western diplomatic missions in that it unquestioningly followed the dynasty's established ceremonial protocol. The Dutch obviously expected that abiding by Chinese formalities would advance their trading interests. Moreover, they dared not risk losing favour with the Chinese government merely through a breach of court decorum. The Qing court, on the other hand, regarded Western nations merely as tributary states to whom occasional conciliatory gestures must be made to keep them under control, the selected method of mollification being that of trade. Governmental relations between China and the West were of a loose, nominal nature. Sentiments expressed regarding common protection were in cognizance of China's superior national power, particularly during the flourishing Qing reign. Upon first arriving in China, the Portuguese and Dutch had no illusions about their ability to contend with this huge nation's superior might, an assumption that inhibited them from any attempt at establishing diplomatic relations on a modern, equal footing.the Dutch tribute protocol compromise was not entirely in vain, it nevertheless failed to produce the desired effect, a reality that was not lost on other European countries. The discovery that adherence to Chinese tribute rituals was insufficient to satisfy Western trading ambitions lessened the likelihood of Western deference to the system's ceremony and rituals. Their reasons, on the one hand, were that such concessions would not achieve their desired interests. On the other, as their power grew stronger, the benefits of compromise correspondingly shrank.establishment of Sino-Russian relations in the early 17th century occurred at a crucial point in China's early interactions with the West. The Russians’ first contacts with China marked a change in Qing diplomatic policy, whereby rulers played down their grandiose self-image and liberalised their foreign policy. Despite these conciliatory gestures, however, early Sino-Russian relations were plagued with intense disputes over diplomatic protocol.after the founding of the Qing dynasty, the Russian government dispatched diplomatic envoys to China to explore trading possibilities. In February 1654, the Russians sent Feodor Baikoff and his mission to China. The Russian Czar gave Baikoff detailed instructions as to protocol, stressing that the letter of credence and gifts should be personally handed to the Emperor. He was also emphatic that the Qing Emperor writes the Czar's full name and title on the diplomatic credentials he presented to Baikoff. If there was any variance on this point, the documents were not to be brought back to Russia. The envoy was forbidden to bow to the imperial palace or to kiss the Emperor's feet, although he was permitted to kiss the Emperor's hand. The Russians were evidently ill informed about Chinese diplomatic protocol.this time, the Qing Court was equally unconversant with Russian affairs. It was unaware, for example, that the Cossack invasion of northeast China had actually been Russian. In view of this historical misapprehension, the Qing court assumed that Baikoff's mission to Peking as one based on admiration of China's culture or economic prosperity.arrival of Baikoff's diplomatic mission in Beijing in March 1656, Qing officials requested that, in accordance with standard protocol, the visiting envoys hand gifts and diplomatic credentials over to them, that they may in turn convey them to the Emperor. But the Russian Czar had specifically instructed Baikoff to deliver the documents and gifts personally. This put him in the predicament of being unable to satisfy one set of protocol without breaching the other. After extensive negotiations, Baikoff was compelled to deliver the gifts that the Czar had exhorted him to present directly to his Chinese counterpart to Qing officials. Shortly after, the Qing court demanded that Baikoff also hand over his credentials. On the basis of his original instructions from the Czar, Baikoff refused. After over four months of deadlock, the Qing court eventually elected to compromise and allowed Baikoff personally to present his credentials to the Emperor.of the wrangling between the Russians and Chinese lacked substantive content. As neither side knew very much about the other, each entered into negotiations with a host of unrealistic expectations. While Baikoff's mission and those later lead by Russian envoys Ivan Perfilyev and Abolin were largely unsuccessful, they substantially increased the two sides’ understanding of one another. Later Russian emissaries clearly benefited from the work of these early diplomatic pioneers.lack of understanding between the two nations did not change until after a military dispute during the reign of the Emperor Kangxi. The most intense conflict over protocol in the early days of Sino-Russian relations was triggered by Nicholas Spafari's mission to China. Emperor Kangxi had already sent two letters to the Czar before Spafari's visit in an effort to resolve the conflict at the Heilongjiang river basin as well as the matter of Tahur chief Gantimur's defection to Russia. This made clear the Qing Dynasty's awareness of its need for flexibility and compromise in diplomatic protocol if it were to reach agreement with Russia on major issues. Soon after Spafari arrived in Beijing, he found that his instructions as to how to present his diplomatic credentials conflicted with Chinese protocol. According to Qing protocol, after each country's tribute had crossed the border its credentials and gifts were to be examined by the official of the relevant locality. Before crossing the Nen river, the protocol official Ma La that received Spafari demanded, according to official protocol, that he hand over his credentials in order that they may be checked for ‘discourteous wording’, also the gifts that they may be scrutinized. This request was flatly refused. Spafari insisted on delivering the documents personally to the Emperor.the time the Russian envoy spent in the capital there seemed to be no end of dispute over the respective protocol. In the normal course of events, upon arrival in the capital the foreign envoy would hand over the credence letters and gifts to be presented to the relevant government office for respective translation and checking. The documents would then be submitted to the Qing emperor and the gifts to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On this occasion the Qing court altered conventional protocol by allowing Spafari to place his letter of credence on top of a yellow damask seal case. This and the gifts were then presented to a Grand Secretariats (Great Academicians of the Inner Hall) acting as Emperor Kangxi's representative. Another difference of opinion as to protocol was that of whether or not the Russian visitors should kowtow or, as the Russian Czar had insisted, merely bow to the emperor. As Qing officials were obdurate on this point of etiquette, the Russian emissaries had to decide between compromise or failure to complete their mission; they ultimately opted for the former option.as to the format and style of diplomatic documents further complicated relations. Qing court conventions in this regard were based on imperial edicts issued to vassal states. Letters of credence submitted by vassal states paying tribute were in complete contrast to conventional Western diplomatic intercourse, which were conducted on the basis of equality of both parties. The Russian envoy to China's mandate was that the Czar's complete name and title be written on the Qing Court letter of credence, thereby upholding the Russian ruler's dignity. If the Chinese refused to comply, the document would not be taken back to Russia. Before Spafari returned to Russia, he demanded a copy of the Qing reciprocal letter of credence in Latin, on the grounds of ensuring that it showed his full title and contained no inappropriate wording that might in any way ‘damage the Czar's dignity’. It was by the similar consideration that the Qing court demanded that Spafari submit the Czar's letter of credence to them in order that Qing officials could translate it and ensure that it did not contain any wording that might be considered disrespectful to the emperor. Spafari refused and Qing officials sternly rebutted. As both sides appeared to have reached a stalemate on this issue, the Qing court took the view that ‘talks between the two rulers have reached a conclusion’, and asked Spafari to leave Beijing for Russia as soon as possible without the reciprocal letter of credence.refusing to issue diplomatic credentials to Spafari, the Chinese were able to avoid further dispute. Scholar Li Yunquan points out that in taking this decision, the Qing court nominally maintained the established system of protocol. In reality, however, it had given considerable thought to whether or not the Russians would accept the high-handed, condescending tone in which the Qing letter of credence had been written. It was at this point that it began to occur to Qing officials that official documents other than imperial edicts should be written in less high-blown language. This posits the suggestion that China's knowledge of the outside world had evolved, moreover that in order to protect China's interests the court had to be prepared to compromise when dealing with more powerful counterparts.

References

1.  Chesneaux, Jean, Marianne Bastid, and Marie-Claire Bergere. China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution. Trans. Anne Destenay. New York: Pantheon, 1976.

2.      "China," Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2004 1997-2004 Microsoft Corporation. All Rights Reserved.

3.      Samuel Wells Williams (1848). The Middle kingdom: a survey of the ... Chinese empire and its inhabitants ....(1 ed.). New York: Wiley & Putnam <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiley_%26_Putnam>. p. 489.

.        Bartlett, Beatrice S. Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723-1820, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991. ISBN 978-0-520-06591-8 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780520065918>.

6.      Ebrey, Patricia. Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook (2nd edition), New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993. ISBN 978-0-02-908752-7 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780029087527>.